Skip to content

Product

Every control, stated once

Every way an agent goes wrong in a regulated institution, and the control that closes it, stated once. Everything here runs today.

The whole surface

20 ways this goes wrong, and what closes each one

Organised by the failure and not by the feature, because you arrive with a fear rather than a shopping list. Everything listed here runs today.

The action itself is wrong

before the call runs

The amount is outside what this agent may approve
Three outcomes: the call is capped to the limit and an approval routed, so the work carries on
Every call is inside the limit; the position they add up to is not
Running state keyed to the entity, so trailing totals and velocity bands are expressible
A tool is used for a customer or a purpose it was never meant for
Least privilege per agent, scoped to the tools and argument ranges that agent needs
The model is talked into an action by the customer or by injected text
The boundary decides on the arguments, so what the model was persuaded of does not matter

A required step never happened

in flight

A disclosure was in the prompt, and nothing proves it reached the customer
Consent, disclosure and approval run as obligations and are receipted before the action commits
A human approved one thing and the agent executed another
What was approved is what executes: the approved parameters are pinned and replayed verbatim
A high-risk action ran without re-verifying who was on the line
Identity and secure input, so a card number or a national ID goes to a channel the model never reads
A cooling-off or cancellation window was not respected
Temporal actions: the clock is a policy condition, not a reminder in someone's runbook

The number was never real

on the figures

A rate, a balance or a payment is stated fluently and bound to nothing
Bound facts and quote tokens: a figure the model did not author and cannot alter
A figure is arithmetically right and derived from a stale source
Fact-graph lineage, so a reviewer reads where a number came from instead of recomputing it
Customer data reaches the model because it was in the context
PII tokenization: sensitive fields become opaque tokens and resolve server-side at execution
One customer's information surfaces in another's conversation
Governed memory, isolation-refused across cases, with erasure that returns a receipt

It happened, and you cannot show what happened

after the fact

Logs record that the action ran, not that the policy ran
Signed, hash-chained decisions pinned to the policy version that made them
A threshold changes and nobody can say what it would have done
Replay and backtest a proposed bundle against real historical traffic before it ships
Enforcement goes live and customers are the ones who find out
Shadow mode decides and records on live traffic while changing nothing
A threshold changed and nobody can say who changed it, or which decisions ran under the old one
Policy changes are chained too, so a decision's bundle digest joins back to the change that produced it

The controls themselves cannot be trusted

around all of it

The rule exists in a policy document and nowhere a machine can read
Upload the document: clauses are extracted, drafted against your registered tools, compiled and fuzzed, and approved one at a time
You believe the controls hold and cannot demonstrate it on demand
Adversarial probes generated from your own policies, including forged identity, consent and approvals, with a pass-fail report
Agents are running somewhere in the estate and nobody can say which of them are governed
An estate report inventories what is running, which endpoints are governed and which are not, and which models are in use
A reviewer asks which rules apply to this tool and the answer means reading Rego
Every tool lists the policies that govern it, and any policy explains itself in the reviewer's language

See it against your stack

Bring one workflow and the owners who sign off on it. We map controls, obligations and evidence against how you actually operate.